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done some good in the world. We have had 13 chüdren they
are all living this 9th day of March 1900. When I look back
over our work that my wife and I have done I wonder how
we could have done so much and have done it so well.
Having arrived at the age of 75 years and work becoming
so hard and my chüdren having all left us but 2 and they
not likely to stay much longer. I concluded to sell our farm
and home and stock and tools and go to some small town
where we could live comfortably rest from our labors. So
we advertised a two day sale on the 17 and 18 days of October
1899. We sold our personal property on the 18 and the farm
the 17. The personal property brought about 3200 dollars.
The 160 acre farm was bid off by Ed Sherwood but was not
taken and was afterward sold to Lew Taylor for eight thousand
doUars and we moved March 5, 1900, and we moved to Arispe
Union Go., Iowa where we had previously bought a house
and lot for $500 where with some addition and repairs we
have a good home and not much work to do. This 28 day of
October 1901.
A HISTORY OF THE MINERS'
RANK OF DURUQUE, 1836-1845
by Eriing A. Erickson
Mr. Erickson is in residence at the Harvard Graduate
School of Business Administration as the recipient of the
Harvard University-Newcomen Society Postdoctoral Fellow-
ship in Business History. This fall he will assume the position
of Assistant Professor of History at the University of the
Pacific, Stockton, Calif.
As America moved West in the 19th century most pioneer
towns were anxious to obtain the services of a bank to aid
in economic development. The services of a chartered bank
(i.e., one authorized to issue paper money convertible to
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specie) were pardeularly coveted in the period before the
passage of the National Banking Act ( 1863 ) when the notes
of state chartered banks accounted for most of the paper
circulation in the country. Thus, before 1863 a local bank was.
necessary not only to furnish credit for development, but
to insure a local circulating medium.
State chartered banks did not exist without serious
problems for customers and bankers alike. In the newer
regions of the coimtry the chronic shortage of specie (gold
and süver) and sound paper money led to many attempts
to start and operate banks without the necessary speeie
backing or with worthless paper currency — to hterally at-
tempt to create money out of thin air. Because banks could
be utüized as adjunets to other speculative schemes, there
were often attempts by economic adventurers to control or
take over banks for their personal gain. Additionally, because
of the poor showing of banks during and following the fi-
nancial panic of 1837, banks of issue faced renewed and
strengthened opposition from the anti-bank wing of the Démo-
cratie party so that in many areas they had to fear for their
very existence. The short but eventful liFe of Iowa's first
chartered bank ülustrates all three of diese problems.
The first and only chartered bank in Iowa Territory, owing
its existence to mining eeonomy of the area, was called the
Miners' Bank of Dubuque. Indians and white explorers had
early discovered lead in the Dubuque region and later, in
the period of Spanish possession of the trans-Mississippi, Julien
Dubuque, a French-Canadian adventurer, by agreement with
the Indians, successfully exploited the mines. Prior to 1833
Indian control of the area caused the federal goverñrnent
to forbid white settlement, but in 1833 the United States pur-
ehased the area from the Indians (the "Blackhawk Purchase")
and opened it for settlement. Prospectors immediately rushed
in to mine the valuable lead deposits.
Many of these early adventurers were successful. The
lead ore in the Dubuque area was of high quality and the
region soon beeame the main lead producing field in the
country. The Upper Mississippi Valley mines in the Dubuque
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region for a time produced over three-fourths of the United
States lead production, with annual receipts before the Civu
War of from $800,000 to $1,200,000.
Lead miners established the town of Dubuque as head-
quarters for their operations in the Iowa District. The town,
within the space of three years, attained a population of 1300
and was the commercial center of the area with "fifty stores
and groceries, supplied with almost every article of necessity
or comfort." Agricultural settlement lagged behind the mining
operations and, as a consequence, the prices paid for the
necessities of life were dear; one resident wrote that groceries
and dry goods were almost double Philadelphia prices. Iu
1836 butter sold for 25 to 50 cents per pound; eggs at 25 to
75 cents per dozen; flour for over $8 a barrel; mess pork,
$25 to $30 per barrel; and com for up to $1.25 per bushel.
Wages, however, were also higher than in Eastern states.
Mechanics received from $2 to $3 per day; laboring men $1.50
per day; and female domestics from $16 to $24 per month,
when available.
The monetary needs of Dubuque were obviously different
from those of agricultural settlements. Agricultural pioneers,
at first subsistence rather than commercial fanners, could
live with little actual money. Dubuque, however, was a com-
mercial settlement, created to serve the needs of the lead
miners. Merchants furnished goods and services at a price,
which necessitated a sound circulating medium. The miners
also urgently needed a bank to facilitate their business and
commercial arrangements. Consequently, in 1836, a group of
merchants and citizens of Dubuque petitioned the legislature
of Wisconsin Territory, of which Iowa was a part, to grant
a charter of incorporation for a bank to serve Dubuque.
Chartered banks played an exceedingly important
monetary role in the United States of the 183O's. A bank's
purpose, then as now, was to furnish credit. In the early 19th
century a bank granted credit by lending its notes,' which
in turn furnished the country with a circulating medium.
A borrower took his loan in bills, and by paying them to others,
passed them into circulation. Of all the functions of a banker.
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that which enabled him to extend credit by promissory notes
was found to be the most profitable, but at the same time
it was the most dangerous to the community for it was open
to accidental and deliberate abuse. Gonsequently the states
gradually intervened, granting only to specially chartered
banking companies and associations the right to issue notes
for circulation—a function that had formerly been considered
a common law right. By the time the Wisconsin Territory
incorporated the Miners' Bank, most states limited by law
the right of issue of notes to incorporated banks; many of
these laws, however, were impossible to enforce. The state
benefited in several ways in this liaison between it and certain
of its citizens—chartered banks often gave the state certain
payments and duties for a charter, and secondly, the citizens
of the state received a more uniform and, hopefully, sounder
circulating medium. Thus, chartered banks had a dual func-
tion: their private role was furnishing necessary credit to
those in need, while their public function was to fumish a
sound circulating medium for the country.
The Wisconsin Territorial Legislature heeded the appeal
for a bank in Dubuque and on Nov. 30, 1836, gave final ap-
proval to an act to incorporate the Miners' Bank of Dubuque.
The United States Gongress gave its assent, with minor re-
visions, on March 3, 1837. The act set the bank's capital at
$200,000, divided into 2,000 shares of $100 each. The legisla-
ture then appointed nine commissioners to take stock sub-
scriptions in Dubuque Gounty and "other places as the com-
missioners may think proper." The commissioners also became
the first board of directors for the bank. Significantly, at least
five of the nine commissioners were Democrats, indicating
that some of the Territorial Democrats were not opposed to
banks of issue, locally controlled.
The most important function of a bank at this time was
the circulation of notes and, therefore, the legislature included
regulations in the charter to provide for a sound note issue.
The Miners' Bank could not issue notes for circulation until
one-half the capital ($100,000) was paid in and of this $40,000
had to be in specie. The act limited total note issue through
a ceiling on the bank's over-all indebtedness. In this case
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the hank's indebtedness, over and above deposits, could not
exceed twice the capital stock actually paid in. The legislature
also displayed the common apprehension of smaU hüls ( they
were helieved easier to counterfeit) hy limiting notes to
denominations of $5 and above and by reserving the right
to raise the minimum denomination to $10 after four years
and $20 after 10 years. To further protect noteholders the
act required redemption, on demand, "in the legal coin of
the United States," of all notes presented at the banking house
in Dubuque. However, no regulation forced the hank to keep
a minimum amount of specie on hand for redemption pur-
poses.
The newly chartered bank proved to be a popular in-
vestment. The commissioners opened the hooks for stock
suhscriptions in the store of Francis Cehon, in May 1837, and
within four days investors subscribed sufficient stock to open
the bank. At this time only 10 per cent of the subscription
had to be paid and it could be in either currency or specie.
A few days later the commissioners gave public notice that
each stockholder would have to make payment of 40 per cent
of the price of his shares by the second Monday in October.
Half of this payment was to be in specie.
On Oct. 14, 1837, the stockholders held a meeting in the
counting room of Ezekiel Lockwood's mercantüe store. The
assembly elected Lockwood, a respected Dubuque business-
man, president, and G. D. Dülon of Dubuque cashier. The
major duties of the officers of 19th century American hanks
were primarüy to inspire confidence in the institution (thus,
the president was usually a respected businessman) and
secondly to sign the notes issued by the bank to circulate
as money. Important matters, such as approval of loans and
discounts, were usually passed on by the whole board of
directors. The cashier alone normally cared for the day-to-day
operations of thé bank including firing up the coal stove in
the morning; and sweeping the floors at the end of the day.
With this formal organization completed the Miners' Bank
opened for the transaction of business on Oct. 31, 1837. It was
first located in the house of LeRoy Jackson, near the comer
of Clay and Ninth Streets.
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The bank's doors had scarcely opened for business when
it became the center of controversy. Within the first several
weeks of its operation rumors began, casting doubt upon the
soundness of the institution. Among the charges circulated
were that the bank issued its first notes before stockholders
made the required payments on their shares ( $100,000 of the
$200,000 capital, of which $40,000 had to be in specie); that
the specie actually paid in had been borrowed for the occasion;
and, that the larger stockholders were attempting to control
the votes of the small stockholders. These rumors soon reached
the Territorial Legislature, then meeting in Burlington, and
the House appointed a committee to examine the condition
of the bank.
In late November 1837, the House committee traveled
to Dubuque and there conducted a cursory examination of
thé bank's affairs. The investigation consisted of a number
of questions submitted in writing to the cashier, G. D. Dülon,
to be answered under oath. Guriously, the committee did
not check the books of the bank or specie holdings, as they
did not deem such action "within the proper scope of their
authority." Dülon's testimony asserted that the bank was free
of the charges rumored against it. The committee accepted
Dillon's statement at face value and declared the bank to
be "in sound and solvent condition."
The legislature's clean bul of health heartened the friends
of the bank. Their pleasure, however, v^as short lived since
the rumors persisted. Many of tlie original complaints were
repeated anew, and in addition, Dülon, the cashier, came
under attack for alleged questionable activities. The Iowa
News, the bank's main public defender, charged that behind
the rumors were certain persons "actuated by malevolent and
base motives, attempting to get up a popular excitement
against it." Under prodding from the North Western Gazette
and Galena Advertiser, edited by the anti-bank son of Alex-
ander Hamilton, the Iotüa News conducted an investigation
of the bank and pronounced it in first class condition.
Hamilton, in an answering editorial, scoffed that such a con-
clusion was "like asking for an egg and receiving a stone"
Hamüton's wry observation proved to be close to the truth.
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The rumors concerning the bank officially reached the
legislature in the form of a petition. The petition, "of a large
number of respectable citizens of Dubuque," called for the
Assembly to annul the bank's charter, because of "gross viola-
tions of its provisions by the directors." On Jan. 19, 1838,
tlie lawmakers, by joint resolution, appointed a second
committee to investigate the affairs of the Miners' Bank.
The subsequent inquiry revealed that the first investigation
had either been a sham or that, as one individual privately
charged, the committee had "allowed themselves to be com-
pletely gulled." The significant findings of the investigation
centered on four main topics: the manner of paying capital
into the bank, the funds used to capitalize the bank, the
amount of speeie paid into tlie bank, and the loan and dis-
count practices of the bank.
The committee's investigation also indicated that the
testimony of C. D. Dillon, given to the first investigating
committee, was questionable. Since the investigation in
November, the bank directors had removed Dülon from his
cashier's post. Additionally, Dillon came under attack in the
publie press; the North Western Gazette and Galena Advertiser
charged that he had made a false statement under oath that
the bank was in sound condition; and, secondly, that he was
a defaulter to the bank in the amount of $4,000.
Moreover, the new cashier, T. O. Martin, gave testimony
that directly contradicted Dillon's November statement. The
two most important points of difference between Dillon and
Martin concerned the amount of specie paid in and the type
of notes used by stockholders to pay for stock. Dillon claimed
tlie bank had $40,000 in speeie on hand before any notes were
issued. Aiartin testified Üiat the specie was not actually on
hand, but instead the bank had a certificate for $iO,000 in
specie deposited in Detroit. Dillon had further testified that
stock was paid for with notes of sound banks, notably New
York Safety Fund, the U. S. Bank, and State Bank of Illinois
notes. Martin's testimony, ho\\'ever, indicated that the bulk
of the notes paid in on the capital came from Michigan banks,
none of which at that time held ereat public confidence!
Warner Lewis, one time Surveyor-Ceneral for the Wisconsin
Territory, corroborated the interpretation that Dülon gave
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a false report of the bank's condition as he presented an af-
fidavit to the House, testifying that Dillon "had stated to him
that the former exhibit made by him to a committee of this
body under oath, was false." Dillon asserted, however, despite
the evidence against him, that the statement he made to the
first committee was "substantially correct."
It became evident, with Dillon's testimony discredited,
that the bank's capitalization and early operation were
questionable. In the first place, there was strong indication
diat shareholders did not pay in the required $100,000 in cap-
ital before the bank commenced note issue. A number of citi-
zens charged, in a petition presented to the House, that part of
the first installment was paid with money loaned from the
Caleña bank, which was promptly paid back; and, that of
the required $80,000 of the second installment, the bank
collected only $4,300. While these specific charges were diffi-
cut to substantiate, the evidence clearly indicated that some
stockholders used stock notes to purchase shares in the bank
(i.e., after paying the first installment, they pledged their
stock — then only partially purchased — back to the bank
for a loan with which to pay for the remainder of the stock).
The former cashier, Dillon, admitted that the directors
discussed taking stock notes and that "some of the stock-
holders have had their stock discounted." J. T. Fales, Secre-
tary of the Iowa Territorial Council, corroborated this charge
at a later investigation ( 1842 ) when he testified that he be-
lieved the stock of the bank was never paid in any other way
"than by the stockholders giving their notes to the institution."
Consequently, only in a technical sense did the shareholders
pay in the $100,000 required before the bank commenced note
issue, and in reality the bank started operations on a fictitious
capitalization.
Of further discredit to the bank was the question of the
specie used to capitalize the institution. The charter required
that the bank have on hand $40,000 in specie before it com-
menced operations. Dillon testified that the required specie
was on hand, but later testimony by Martin revealed that
this was only a certificate for specie deposited in a Detroit
bank. This was a commonly used subterfuge employed by
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slick operators to cover, the lack of specie. John Jay Knox,
former Gomptroller of the United States, wrote conceming
the use of specie certificates :
These were borrowed by those who wished to start
banks, for a consideration and when the ordeal of
examination by the commissioners had been safely
passed, were promptly returned. There were banks
and individuals in Detroit who made a business of
loaning certificates and starting banks.'
The committee agreed to give the bank a few months in which
to obtain the specie on deposit in Detroit. The committee
held a supplementary investigation in June 1838, but at that
time the bank possessed only $457.30 in specie on hand and
a vague item, "specie intransito," which failed to satisfy
the committee.
The type of paper money used to capitalize the bank and
which the bank circulated through its normal business ac-
tivities, also revealed poor or dishonest banking practices.
To the committee's question, "in what kind of funds has your
capital stock been paid in?" Dillon and Martin again gave
conflicting answers. Dillon claimed that shareholders pur-
chased the capital stock with specie and notes, and that most
of the notes came from sound banks, specifically tlie Safety
Fund banks of New York, the U.S. Bank and the State Bank
of Illinois. If, however, notes of these sound institutions were
ever in the bank's possession, they probably were only on
loan for the purpose of making the bank appear on a sound
footing. Dillon eventually admitted that of the funds in the
bank in November 1837, some belonged to the bank, some
to him, and some to other "individuals."
Martin's testimony before the second investigating com-
mittee, directly contradicting Dillon, revealed that individuals
purchasing the bulk of the bank's shares used notes of the
Jackson Gounty Bank and the Bank of Manchester, both of
Michigan and both discredited. Tlie Michigan Bank Gom-
missioners made the following report (1838) concerning the
Jackson Gounty Bank:
'John Jay Knox, A History of Banking in the United States, New
York: Bradford Rhodes & Co., 1900, 734.
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On examination of the books of the Jackson County
Bank, the following circumstances were exhibited: the
names of the persons and corporations with whom
accounts had heen opened were written in pencü; the
entires in ink. In a few minutes, therefore, the whole
face of the business transactions of the bank could
have at any time been entirely changed.
Upon examination of the institution's specie reserve the
commissioners found:
Cold coin was exhibited loose in a drawer, which,
being counted, amounted to the sum of $1,037.78;
about $150 in loose silver was also counted. Beneath
the counter of the bank, nine boxes were pointed out
by the teller as containing $1,000 each. The teller se-
lected one of these boxes and opened it; this was ex-
amined and appeared to be a full box of American
half dollars. One of the Commissioners then selected
a box, which he opened, and found the same to con-
tain a superficies only of silver, while the remaining
portion consisted of lead and ten penny nails. The
Commissioner then proceeded to open the remaining
seven boxes; they presented the same contents pre-
cisely, with a single exception in which the substratum
was window glass broken into small pieces."
From this evidence it must be concluded that the Miners'
Bank did not have the required specie on hand before issuing
notes, and that the money shareholders used to pay for capital
stock was either fictitious (stock notes) or the notes of worth-
less banks. Thus, it was a bank capitalized without specie,
and with wortliless notes or nonexistent currency. This,
however, was not a totally uncommon occurrence in early
19th century American hanking.
The investigating committee also uncovered questionable
operations in the discounting procedures of the bank. By
February 1838, the bank granted loans and discounts in the
amount of $53,711.78. Of this amount the officers of the Miners'
Bank used only $14,030 in notes of their bank, while using
^William Craham Siimner, A History of Banking in the United
States, New York: N. Y. Journal of Commerce, 1896, 329-330.
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"about twenty thousand" in notes of the doubtful Jackson
Gounty and Bank of Manchester and "about twenty thousand
dollars in tlie notes of . . . other banks." The use of notes
of questionable banks for discounting purposes became even
more apparent when the second investigating committee made
its supplemental investigation in June 1838. Between February
and June 1838, the bank made an additional $38,528.48 in loans
and discounts. These were made "principally in the notes
of Michigan and Wisconsin banks received in the course
of . . . regular business." The bank's intention was obvious. By
using the notes of other banks for discount purposes, it did
not have to issue its own notes—notes redeemable in specie.
The notes the bank did issue gave further evidence of its desire
to make loans without incurring the hazard of specie redemp-
tion. By June 5, 1838, the bank circulated $11,038 of its notes,
of which only $460 were payable on demand in specie. If this
practice could have been kept up indefinitely, the bank would
have had little worry about keeping any specie on hand.
The members of the committee were distressed with the
activities of the bank. In particular, they deplored its flooding
the country with the notes of the Jackson Gounty and Man-
chester banks, "which institutions have proved to be in-
solvent" and they did not believe "specie intransito . . . worthy
of being depended upon." They concluded the bank had
"violated, misused, and abused" privileges granted in the
charter. The committee recommended to the legislature that
it revoke tlie charter of the Miners' Bank and settle its ac-
counts so that the public may suffer as little as possible."
However, the legislature took no action. That summer ( 1838 )
Gongress separated Iowa from Wisconsin and established it
as a separate territory. Gonsequently, the new Iowa Territorial
government fell heir to the knotty problem of the Miners'
Bank.
When the first assembly of the Iowa Territorial govern-
ment convened (November 1838), Stephen Hempstead, an
anti-bank Democrat, immediately proposed a continuation of
the investigation of the Miners' Bank. The legislature approved
a joint resolution embodying Hempstead's proposal and ap-
pointed a committee of three. The committee conducted this
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inquiry in a manner simüar to the first two; they submitted
written questions to the cashier, to be answered under oath.
In explaining the bank's situation, the cashier, T. O.
Martin, dodged a number of sensitive issues. He side-stepped
the direct question of how much eapital stoekholders paid
in before the bank commenced operations by evasively an-
swering, "Fifty per cent upon the eapital stock was required
to be paid in before the bank could legally commenee oper-
ations." This parry apparently satisfied the committee. They
were impressed that the "cash on hand" was nearly double
the liabüities of the bank, and eoncluded the bank was in
a "safe and solvent condition." The legislature approved the
committee's report exonerating the bank of any wrongdoing.
However, investigation reveals the bank officers may not have
been as guütless as found by the eommittee; for example,
the item, "cash on hand," turned out to be notes of other
banks ($18,874), "cash items" ($493.87) and gold and süver
($3,033). Of the actual speeie on hand ($3,033), the bank
possibly obtained $3,000 of it the evening before the bank
examination for the purpose of impressing the investigating
eommittee. Martin, the cashier, wrote to Thomas McKnight,
a Dubuque businessman and later Whig candidate for gover-
nor, the evening before the examination that he had "paid
out eonsiderable specie" and as there was more "Current
Bankpaper than Specie on hand I am quite anxious to get
your $3000 if possible for which I \vill give you some Eastern
funds."
While the above activities indicated careless banking
practices, there was nothing to suggest, as in the beginning
of its operations, anything dishonest about the bank's policies.
The first stockholders and officers who pursued a deliberate
policy of dishonest banking—of starting a bank without specie
and using the notes of discredited banks for discounts—ap-
peared to have passed from the scene. A group of Dubuque
eitizens, anxious for the bank's welfare, conducted a private
investigation in the summer of 1838. One of the investigators,
Robert D. Sherman, a member of the bank's board of direc-
tors, concluded that "a majority of the stock has changed
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hands and is now held, I believe, by honest men." Another
investigator, concurring in Sherman's opinion that the first
shareholders had been up to little good, was now satisfied
that "the present Stockholders intend doing something for
the benefit of Dubuque."
The fact that the bank managed to stay out of the limelight
for the next few years and apparently furnished Dubuque
with a sound circulating medium (the notes circulated at
par in St. Louis) corroborates the contention that honest men
now controlled the institution. Nevertheless, the financial
turmoil following the panic of 1837 caused problems for the
Miners' Bank and it, like banks throughout the country,
suspended specie payments (March 29, 1841). The directors
claimed, with apparent justification, that the suspension was
to protect the bank from certain interests in St. Louis—that
a St. Louis banking house discredited Miners' Bank notes,
collected large amounts» of them at a discount and demanded
specie from Dubuque. The Bloomington Herald, charged that
St. Louis companies made a profit of from 10 to 12 per cent
by dealing in Miners' Bank notes. The paper further charged
that various companies in St. Louis, from the beginning, had
pursued an illiberal course against the Miners' Bank because
they feared "it might assist the smelters in rescuing the lead
trade from St. Louis monopolists, which would deprive them
of their greatest source of speculation." The bank, to show
its good intentions and demonstrate the suspension was aimed
at the St. Louis companies, promised to pay specie to citizens
in "small amounts as shall be required for the convenient
transaction of business." To further allay fears, the bank
published a statement of its affairs as of March 29, 1841. From
this statement it appeared that the bank was in sound condi-
tion; its demand liabilities were $103,104 (note circulation
$97,005 and deposits $6,099), for which it had for redemption
purposes $40,051.99 "gold and silver on hand."
The bank's solvent condition did not last long. In early
1842 the cashier presented, by demand of the Legislative
Assembly, a statement of tlie bank's affaii's as of Jan. 1, 1842.
The statement was purposefully vague and left doubt as to
tlie real condition of the bank. The bank's note circulation
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had increased since suspension by $70,025, to $167,030, a strong
indication that the bank officers were not opposed to using
the protection of specie suspension to increase note issue.
Also included in the statement was an item, "notes on special
deposit with other banking institutions . . . $16,000." The
meaning of this last item is not clear, but it was probably
a special note issue. Taken together, however, the special
notes on deposit and regular circulation exceeded the
authorized note issue ($200,000) by $13,030. The actual
amount of specie on hand was also difficult to determine from
the statement. Instead of listing specie separately, the cashier
lumped together "Gold, silver and Notes of the State Bank
of Missouri.. . $43,277.66."
Evidence also indicated that financial circles were losing
confidence in the bank. Mortimer Bainbridge, a Whig member
of the Gouncil from Dubuque, defended the bank from Demo-
cratic attacks in the legislature, arguing its credit was high
among the people of the community. However, the activities
of the bank's notes in the St. Louis money market did not
substantiate Bainbridge's optimistic assessment. In early
spring of 1842 the notes of the bank fell sharply in value. On
Feb. 28, 1842, a correspondent from St. Louis stated that
Miners' Bank notes "are no longer received," and the
prevalent impression was that they "would go down entirely."
By fall of 1842 the "St. Louis Bank Note table, based on
specie," quoted Miners' Bank notes at "no sale."
Both branches of the Legislative Assembly did make ef-
forts to force the bank to resume specie payments. Majorities
in both houses favored forcing specie resumption, but the
differences in the type of bul passed in each house stalled
cooperation and both specie resumption acts died. However,
a few months later the bank on its own initiative briefly
resumed specie payments. In June 1842, a group of men con-
nected with the St. Louis Gas Light Gompany purchased
controlling interest in the bank. A Mr. Pearson, one of the
principal clerks in the Gas Light Go., became the bank's
new cashier, while the new directors were all prominent
Dubuque businessmen. The new management did make an
effort to resume specie payments. The Gas Light Go.
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deposited $20,000 in specie in the Caleña Bank, "for the pur-
pose of receiving the Duhuque money." The resumption of
specie redemption only lasted one week, the bank again
suspended and the notes fell rapidly in value. By the end of
1842 the notes were worth less than 50 per cent of face value.
J. T. Fales, Secretary of the Iowa Council, testified before
a legislative committee that one of the directors of the bank,
Patrick Quigley of Dubuque, posted a notice in his store, "notes
of the Miners' Bank of Dubuque taken here," but paid only
40 cents on the dollar.
Testiniony at a later committee investigation revealed
that some aspects of the Gas Light Co. take-over were
questionahle, like other events in the checkered career of
the bank. For example, Timothy Davis, a Dubuque lawyer
and one of the directors of tlie bank, testified that the Cas
Light Co. circumvented the requirement that all dkec-
tors be Iowa residents and own shares in the bank by giving
stock certificates to prominent Dubuque citizens to qualify
them for directorships. Davis stated that he "was not inter-
ested in the institution one cent, and intended to return the
certificate when he ceased acting as director." Additionally,
the bank's new owners made unwise financial arrangements.
The bank officers permitted a Mr. St. John of St. Louis to
become a stockholder to the amount of $40,000, "hy giving
his notes to the institution." Afterwards, St. John borrowed
$57,000 from the bank, all of which the institution lost when
St. John's business failed and he took refuge in the hankruptcy
act.
By the end of 1842 the bank was moribund. In December
1842, tlie Ioiva City Standard, a Whig defender of the bank,
reported that Thomas Rogers, a Dubuque Democrat, intended
to introduce legislation to repeal tlie bank's charter. The paper
concluded: "It is pretty well known that tlie institution is
not at present doing any business, and has but little paper
afloat. From these causes very limited interest is felt upon
the suhject of the continuance of its charter. We look upon
it as probable that the charter will be forfeited."
The Füth Legislative Assembly (1842-43) was then in
session, and Rogers introduced a bul in the House to repeal
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the charter of the bank. A select committee investigated the
bill and two weeks later submitted a majority report favoring
repeal. The report, in summarizing the case for repeal,
charged the bank with three distinct violations of its charter:
( 1 ) it had commenced business before shareholders had paid
in the required amount of money on the capital stock sub-
scribed and thus the charter had been "most wantonly
violated, and a base fraud perpetrated upon public confi-
dence;" (2) it has on its board of directors members who
were not bona fide stockholders, because the bank had given
them stock to qualify them for the position; (3) the third,
and "greatest delinquency," was its suspension of specie
payments for its notes. The committee apparently made a
convincing case, as the Whigs and Democrats in the House
• unanimously approved the bul.
The Gouncü, unlike the House, contained members sym-
pathetic toward the plight of the bank and consequently the
repeal bul encountered difficulties in the upper house. The
Gouncü shunted the bul aside to the Judiciary Gommittee.
After more than two weeks of deliberation, the committee
recommended rejection of the biU. The committee reasoned
that the question of whether the bank had forfeited the charter
could only "be ascertained and enforced by judicial
proceedings." It, therefore, concluded that the Legislative
Assembly did not possess the right to repeal the charter and
for it to do so would involve "an assumption of power . . .
unauthorized and arbitrary." The Gouncü never did vote on
the House bill, but küled it when the six Whigs in the 13-man
body, joined by one Democrat, defeated a motion to bring
it to a vote.
WTiile the Legislative Assembly considered charter repeal,
the bank again got involved in a questionable affair. The
Ioiva Capitol Reporter charged tliat a number of nameless
individuals wanted to revive the "rotten and worthless"
institution, and to this end an agent from Illinois made to a
number of legislators "some offers and promises of personal
reward and private advantage" in retum for their help. The
House immediately appointed a committee to investigate the
bribery charges.
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The committee, after a thorough investigation, reported
baek and indicated there was substance to some of the charges.
The committee discovered that Dr. Richard Barrett of Spring-
field, IU., wrote four members of the legislature, asking them
to assist in saving the bank's charter untü sueh time that
he and his associate, Thomas Mather of Springfield, could
buy out the interests in the bank held by the now bankrupt
St. Louis Cas Light Co. One letter contained an offer
of private "benefits" in case the charter was saved; in the
other letters there were no offers of personal reward, but
merely a statement of Barrett's hope to revive the bank, and
a request for the support of these members in the publie in-
terest.
Barrett and Mather, the principals behind this move to
revive the bank, were not new to schemes of finaneial
manipulation. Mather, in 1835, was involved in a political
power play that gave his group financial eontrol of the State
Bank of Illinois. Mather had Ijecome president of the bank,
a position he still held in 1843. Barrett was one of the leading
land speculators in the Iowa-Illinois region (he purchased
in Eastern Iowa alone 29,046 acres for resale) and needed
large sums of money from banks to complete his land deals.
At this time Barrett's Illinois financial connections suffered
a setback as the state forced Illinois banks into liquidation.
Ownership of the Miners' Bank would have created an alterna-
tive money supply and have aided Barrett in his speculative
enterprises.
The majority report of the committee appointed to in-
vestigate the briljery charges concluded that Barrett attempted
to influence legislation and condemned him for his actions.
At the same time they cleared of any suspieion the members
who reeeived letters from Barrett. The committee, over the
protests of two Democrats, also declared the editors of the
Ioiva Capitol Reporter "justly deserving censure" for making
a charge against these lawmakers that was "utterly untrue
and highly reprehensüjle in its character."
The eensure of the Democratic Iowa Capitol Reporter
brought an explosive personal note to the controversy. The
editors of the paper, in eommenting on the committee's report,
referred to the chairman as "this dog, Walworth," and the
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committee as "these paltry, puny whipsters." Ceorge
Walworth, the committee chairman, took offense and cornered
the editor of the paper, Jesse Williams, in the library of the
Capitol, where he "grappled his man, floored and mounted
him, and proceeded to beat into his brains by dint of hard
knocks . . ." While WiUiams "bellowed most lustily for help,"
Walworth, "a pigmy" compared to 6-footer Williams,
"marched from the battleground bearing the cane of the
vanquished colonel [Williams] as an evidence of victory."
Williams evened the score a few days later when he tlirashed
Walworth with a whip.
The legislative attempt to repeal the bank's charter and
the bribery attempt were only a portion of its problems. The
evidence presented to the legislature indicated that the bank,
by early 1843, was in sorry financial condition. The institution's
liabilities amounted to $121,087, while its total assets were
only $60,730.26. Obviously the bank had sustained large losses.
However, of the liabilities, $105,190 were in notes of the
Miners' Bank held by stockholders. Only $8,190 of the bank's
notes were in other hands. With these new disclosures of
financial ineptitude or dishonesty by the bank's managers, the
enemies of the institution renewed their attempt to destroy it
in the next session (1843-44) of the legislature. The Demo-
cratic-controlled House passed a bill to repeal the charter, but
again the Council, this session controlled by the Whigs ( seven
Whigs, six Democrats), stalled the repeal attempt.
Soon after the completion of the legislative session, the
Miners' Bank, on its own initiative, resumed payment of its
liabilities in specie (Apru 19, 1844). Thereafter, until repeal
of the charter, the bank claimed that it "promptly met all
its liabilities." Just what this meant, or whether the people
of Iowa denefited from resumption, is not clear. The Ioioa
Capitol Reporter charged that the new owners (Barrett and
Matlier) could safely resume specie payments because they
had purchased, "for a mere song," the outstanding liabilities
of the bank. Thus, according to the paper, resumption was
a sham, because the owners redeemed the notes they pur-
chased at "a discount of 75 to 80 per cent," and in this manner
"swindled the creditors of the Bank." Tlie Reporter's charge
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is difficult to substantiate. However, the cashier's statement
to an investigating committee the previous year indicated
that stockholders held almost all the bank's notes and they
obviously would have benefited greatly by resumption. It is
also difficult to believe that out-of-state stockholders ( Barrett
and Mather) would put the bank on its feet primarily for the
benefit of its creditors. Barrett, as suggested before, would
have benefited enormously by reviving the Miners' Bank so
he could obtain credit for his speculative enterprises.
The bank's legislative enemies finally succeeded in
repealing the institution's charter in the Seventh Legislative
Assembly. Conditions in 1845 were more favorable for repeal
than ever before as elections for the legislature returned a
large Democratic majority to the Gouncil ( 11 Democrats, two
Whigs). Previously the Council was closely divided between
the Democrats and Whigs and was partisan toward the bank.
Tlie proponents of repeal, in the absence of new transgressions
by the bank, gave a recital of the previous testimony to explain
why the charter should be revoked. The House then
unanimously approved a bill to repeal the bank's charter
and the Gouncil, now bolstered by a large Democratic
majority, passed the House version without amendment.
The law repealing the bank's charter provided that the
thü-d district judge should appoint two trustees to settle the
affaii-s of the institution. They were directed to sell the "per-
sonal and real estate" of the bank to pay its liabilities. If
any money remained after "payment of debts and necessary
expenses," the trustees were to divide it among the stock-
holders. Any debt due the bank could be paid in Miners' Bank
notes, which would be accepted "at the value expressed on
dieii- face."
The bank's board of directors, upset over tlie repeal, issued
an address to the people of Iowa, protesting the action of
the legislature. The address was largely a review of the bank's
operations, defending it from the charges used to justify repeal
of the charter and warning that they would not relinquish
control of the bank without a fight. When the court-appointed
trustees attempted to settle the affairs of the bank, the
directors, true to their word, refused to give up control. The
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trustees then hrought suit in district court to force the directors
to relinquish control (November 1845). The court found in
favor of the trustees, and when the directors appealed, the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision.
The directors then hrought suit in the district court,
questioning the constitutionality of the repeal. The district
court held that the legislature had the authority to repeal
the hank's charter. The directors appealed the decision and
in July 1848 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
judgment and the trustees finally obtained legal control of
the hank. This was, however, largely a formality, as in the
intervening three years the hank's affairs were settled and
it ceased to exist. On Feb. 25, 1849, the directors of the bank
held a final meeting to dissolve formaHy their connections
with the hank.
In looking hack over the history of the Miners' Bank,
certain aspects of its shadowy career invite conclusion. The
bank was to a certain extent the victim of the disturhed
economic conditions following the panic of 1837. But, on the
other hand, much of the bank's trouble resulted from wülful
deceit, or, at best, bad management. At the time of its forma-
tion in 1837 the hank officers did not fulfill the requirements
of the charter: they allowed the use of stock notes to pay
in capital funds and, thus, only in a technical sense was the
required capital paid in; and no actual specie was in the bank,
only a certificate of specie deposited in a Detroit bank. Ad-
ditionally, after commencing business the bank promoted the
circulation of currency from wüdcat banks in Michigan.
When the bank suspended specie payments in 1841, it
was in reasonably sound condition (and was under new
management). And this suspension was part of a general
suspension throughout the country caused by the general
economic distress. After this, however, the bank's record was
doubtful. It füled its board with dummy directors to meet
residence requirements of the charter; the new owners—
Barrett and Mather—made an attempt to improperly influence
legislators to vote in favor of the hank; and it resumed specie
payments under the plausible charge that the resumption
benefited only the stockholders.
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The loss to the community' through the depreciation of
bank notes is difficult to estimate. There certainly was some
loss because the notes were widely circulated in the area,
and when the bank suspended specie payments in 1841 they
quickly depreciated. In 1842, the "St. Louis Bank note table,
based on specie," listed the Miners' Bank at "no sale." In
1843, J. T. Fales testified that the notes were worth from 37
to 40 cents in Dubuque. It was charged that bank stockholders
purchased notes at these depreciated prices. Testimony to
the legislature in 1843 tended to substantiate this charge,
as at that time stockholders controlled almost all the notes.
At least one director of the bank, Patrick Quigley, openly
discounted the notes at 40 cents on the dollar in his place
of business. Gonsequently, it is likely that the stockholders
would have greatly benefited from resumption in 1844, and
the ex-note holders would have been the losers.
While a number of Whigs did join with the Democrats
in the various attempts to repeal the bank's charter, the
struggle did have an ultimate political impact. The sorry
showing of the Miners' Bank strengthened the hand of the
anti-bank wing of the Iowa Democratic Party (i.e., those
ideologically opposed to all banks of issue) so diat in the
Gonstitutional Gonvention of 1846 they controlled the party
and were able to pass a constitutional prohibition of all banks
of issue in Iowa—a prohibition that lasted until 1857.
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